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In the law of real property, two maxims have long
Jand is de-

served to d fine and limit ownership in land.

-fined to be the soil of the earth, including -,-rything
standinz upon or turied beneath its surface;

and property

in it is snid to extend upward and downward without limit.
In this theoreticaiidca of indefinite extension from the
heavens Rbove to the very center of the earth below, is emn
braced the first of the maxims: "Cujus est solum ejus usque
ad caelum, et ad infernos".

In this-maxim we find a bropd, and comprehensive
securing to the pro-

definition of the right, of property,

prietor of real estate a free and absolute ownership, a perk
feet an4 unrestricted right of enjoynent.

He may dig down

iidefinitely ,into the earth, and revel in.its mysteries: he
may build upward as far as he dare t o aspire.
directions he has a-pparently nothing to desire;
others a difficulty confronts him.
rounded complletely by other land

In these
but in

He finds himseif surproprietors whose owner-

ship is as full and absolute as his own.

He realizes with

alarm that the air he mulst breathe, the water he nmst drink,
t.he light 'thst. he enjoys, come to h.i
his neighbors,

across the lands of

and may at any moment be interfered with so

as to rendir th~e enjoynent~ ot' his property impossible.

In vie w of the difficulties in this direction,
another maxim came into exi"V;tece: "Sic utere tuo
non lIeda,".

its obilions limitation upon)the

itt

alienum

other created

a conftictin c border !and in the law of real property, COnstantly presenting new difficulties, the settlement of which
is made none the easier by many dubious Pnd unsatisfactory
precedents.
Among the cases in which litigants have based
their claims of right respectively upon these two maxims,
are those inlolving rights of water.

The courts have seen

fit to draw a sharp line of distinction between underground
waters and those that flow upon the surface in well defined
channels,

it

i

,well and uniformly settled that the owner-

ship of land gives only the ri,<ht to a reasonable use of' the
water flowing through it

in surface channels,

and no per-

manent right of property in the water itself.

In o-rher

words, each riparian propiietor of land over which streams
of water flow in well defined surface channels,

has a clear

legal right, resu iting from his ownership of the ?.oil, to

have the water of' such streams c ontinu1e in its natural and
accu stomed course, subject only to a reasonable use of such
water by the upper riparian own-rs.

And the same principies

are qii}te generally conceded to appl~y to subterranean waters

if

they flow, in defined arid known channels.
In this riuu,

of' ordiinary mdl

reasonable use, the

conrts have drawn, between the conflicting ri. hls and duties
..ecured and iml.osed by the two naxiriis, an admirahle 'ividing

line,

osp;sin

sufficient esticity to xork cimp -tete

Justice in 1.raciicaliy all cases, anl still
in the rigidity essential to a law.
by ?,r. Justice

ooley,

,)ot lacking

The _nile is well stated

in Duivont. V. Kellogp; (29 Mich. 423),

thus: "As hetwon dii'ferent proprietors on the same stream,
the right of' each qualififis the ot.her, anI the question

ilway.; is,

not merely whot.her ,.he. lovwef proprietor

suffers

damag-e by the use of' the .ater alove him, nor whether the
qiantity i'iowving on is

diminished [-y the use,

fbut whether,

under all the circumstances oi the case, the use of the
wp+er by one is reasonable a-ld

onsistent dth a corresp on-

dent en ioyment of tke right by the other:

In determining

the reasonabheness of' the use, the courts have found it
ver'

con-

:nt t.( vakp n. futrther dlistinction i-.etw(ei so called

ordinary and extraord'.inary uses. Water to supply man's
n-aturai.

wants is

LqL wants,

an ordrinary ise, and to

an extraordinary use.

nuply his artific-

The re,.i dii'ference pointel

out by the a nthorities between t,e.,t

o lasses of uses, is

t.hat wat.er may be us .d for ordinary purposes ,aithout regard
to the.eff'ects of such use in

of'sea ,deficiency to those
o+

below on the .-tream, while in reference to the extraordinary
uses, the effect npon those below must always be considered
in determining its reasonableness.

According to the great

weight of common law authority, where the supply of water
is very small for these natural or ordinary uses, the upper
riparian owner may if

necessary consuime al the water of the

stteam to supply his natural wants, but not for

any other

pUPPiose.
These 7,rinciples, so admirably adapted and iiniversally accepted by the courts to govern conflicting rights
in surface streams and such subterranean currents as ar,
known and defined, have almost uni-rersaliy declared inapplie
cable to subterranean waters percolating through the soil
or flowing in inknowr and-:undefinedcurrents.

The practical

uncertainties and difficulty of proof caused the courts to
shrink from attempt.ing to formulate and apply a rule of law
respecting iundergrolitnd waters which should serve similarly
as a dividing line between the conflict.ing right s and duties
of property owners.

They early declared that percolating

waters were part of the soil in which they were focund and na
in the eye of t",e law distinct from the earth;

and

left

each owner to dig down and appropriate all the water he

miht, find t,eneath, the surf'ace to his own purpose,
free will

at, his

nd pleasure, without regard to the effect uion

his neighbor.

.
Utterly

lisrpgarding with respect to these

qiiestions the duty imposed upon each p roprty owner by our .
second maxim, the first was applied,

alone and unrestrictld,

in all its harshn,ss and injustice; ,.nd so the law has been
settled by a long and almost uninterrupted line of cases.
Chief JUstice Chapm:n, in the i-aaing case of
B,-dord (108 Mass. 265 , states tie rlie

Wilson v New

as follows: "The

percolat-ing watczr belongs to the owner of t'e La.nd as much
as the land itself, or the rocks and stones in it. Th-refor
he may ri-g 9 well and make it very large, anrl draw up the
water by machinery or othervise in such quantities as to

supply aqueducts f'or a la, ge neighborhood.

He may thuis

take the water which would otherwise pass by natural per-

colation into his neighbor's land, and ,d.waw of f the water
which may come by natural percolation "rom his n'eighbor's
land".
All the decisions of the AmericAn colrts and of
E'ngland nre in virtal

harmony w,'ith the rule as st, ted,

except.ing onLy the single state of New, Hamshire.

The courts

of that, state have declared a,meore liberal rule, based purei,

upon principle, and ignori,.* utt ry the doctrine so well
established

y exis,tinP precedents

FoiLowing the analogy

of the law a. lied to curf'.ce s'veamns as closely as the

nature of the two

tsituations adlTits, they ha.ve used the

maxim, "Sic utere"&c, to quai*

the rights of

ind. owners

in reg ardrto percoiatinw waters, 9nd. dr..wn between the correspondent rights

w

"uties resulting a lividing line of

reasonable use ol one's prop -rty in ,iew of the corresponden-t
rights of

others.

ly this rule, a.s in

the case of water

cour:ses, the ri;.':hts of the respecti.,e proprty owners are
considered correiati-vely,

mRd what is such reasonable exer-

cise of one's right or privilege is to b.-. determined unde;.
all the circumstances of' each particultar c.se, from its
necessities and in view of the corres-tonding rights of
others.

Here w- have ,eoctrino

broadly reaching the many

in.ju.stices v.;hich the other, narrow,
must work.

Thle _principP1,

if

strict and arbitrary,

not the: only exc-ase suggested

for the general preference shown the

ormer rule, is the

difficulty o f applying the l.tt.er, by reason of1 the sup-

posed imp;ossibility o

knowing or provfing with reasonable

certainty the sources of su~;ply hidden b eneath th~e surface.

This may be seen by exmining the opinions of' the learned
J'ldc~es in some of t he earlier leading cases, with

view

to ascertaining the motives of expediency by which they were
actuate d.
The earliest cAse in
(12 M.& W.336) decided in 1843.
td from the Civil

1 aw,

ngf.and was Acton v Blundell
The ruli applied was impor-

and stated by Jiuisti ce Maule as fol-

lows: "If a man dig a well in his own field and thereby
drains his neighbor's, he may do so unless he does it maiiciously".

And Chief Justice Tindall, in passing upon the

case, said: "If the man who sinks the well in his own land
can acquire by that act an, absolute ri, t to the water that
collects in it,, he has the power of preventing, his neighbor
from making Rny use of the' spring in his own soil which shaij
interfere-,with the enjoyment of the well.

He has the power

still further of' debarring the owner of the land in which
the spring is first found, or through which it
mitted, from draining his land
of *he soil.

is trans-

or the proper cultivation

.. The adxantage on t1h e one side and. the

detriment on the other may bear no proportion.

The well may

be sunk to supply a cottage, or a drinking; p race for cattle,
whilst the ownwr of adjoining land may be prevrented from mim

ing metal s an~d minerals ot' inestim abie value".

His opinion

concludies as follows: "We think this case, for the reasons -

given,

is not to be governed by the law which app ties to

rivers and flowing streams, buts that it

rather falls within

the princip:le that gives the owner all that lies beneath
the surf'ace:

that the land immeriately below is his prois solid rockor porous ground,

prty, whether it

or venous

earth, or tart soil, part water: that the pers)-on who owns
the soil may dig therein and apply aJl that there is found
to his own iurlpose at his frje will and pleasure;

and that

if in the exercise of such right, he intercepts and drains
o ffi the water collected from underground springs in his
neighbor's well, this inconvenience to his neighbor falls
within the description of>"damnum absque in.iuria", which can
not be the ground for action".
In the early American cpse of lioath v Driscoll
( 20 CoTn.

533

,

Jidge FilLsworth iiistifies the position

taken by the decision in the following lanpiae: "1,ach owner
has an equal ann complete right to the use of his own land
and to the water vhich is in it.
or pa .sing through it,

Water combined with earth

by percolation, or by filtration, or

chemical attraction,has no distinct character of ownership
prom the earth i~self, not more than the metallic oxide ot'

which the earth is composed

.

Wa.ter, whether mooring or

motionless in the earth, is not, in t he eye o+' the law, dis-

tinct from the errth.

The laws of" its existenc- , and progres

while there, are not uniform, and cannot be known or regulated. It risPs to great heights, and moves collaterally,
by influences beyond' ,our apprehension. Th-se influences are
so secret, changPable .nd uncontrollable, we cannot subject
them to the regulations, nor bui 14 upon 'hem a system of
rules, as has been done with stream upon .the surface. --W

am-Were

it

-

otherwise, one man by sinking a well, thorugh

comparatively iinimportpnt, might prevent the sinking of
other wells, and the improvementof

neighborhoods, by drain-

ing marshes -&c, an4 even the opening od mines of metal or
coal, a9a; the water might, not percolate with the same freeness and abundance as before.

Beside, no man is bound to

kvnow that his neijhbor's well is supplied by wate-r. percol-....

aing in his own soil;

and he ought-not tierefore to be

held to lose his rights -by such continued enjoyment.

He can

not know that the first well requires any ol.her than the
natural and common use of' water under the surface;

nor by

what means it appears in one.place orV'the other; nor which
of the persons~who fijrst or afterwards opens the earth,

encroaches; upon the right of the other".
In t he leading Pennsylvrania c.' se of! Wheatley v
,Baugb4 2SPa.: St. 5 .8)

the p revrailing opinion argues in the

same strain: "When the filtrations are gathered together in

suficient voLiume tohave an appreciabl e valie, and to flow

in a ciearly defined channel, it
spe it

and to avoid diverting it,

to,

is Renerailly possible

without serious detriment

to the owner of the l.nd throupvh which it

flows.

But per-

colations spread in every direction throutgh the earth,and it
is

imossible to avoid distur'itng them without relinquishing

the necessary enjoymt-nt of the land.

Accordingly, the law

has never gone so far as to recognize in one man a right
to convert :nother's farm to his own use for the purpose of
a filter.

Such a claim, if'sustained, would amount t o a

total abrogation of' the right ofiproperty.

-No
man-cs.uld

dig- a cellar or a well or build a house on, his own land, bee
cause these operatiuns necessarily interrupt the filtration
through the earth. 'Nor could he cut down the forest and clear his land for the purpose of husbandry, because the
evaporation which wouid be caused by exposing the earth to
the sun and air, wou1d inevitably fliminish, to some extent,
the supply of water which would otherwise filter through it.
He could not even turn a furrow for qgriculturai purposes,
because this would partially produce t he same result.

I,'ven

if this right were admitted to exist, the difficulty in ascertaining the fact of its violation, as well
o f it,

would be insurmoutable."

as the extent

It seems hardly necessary to rewfer to the utter
absurdity of such a.rPnments as that the adoption of' any othe
rule wouidamourit to a total abro grtion of the right of
property, and prevTent one man from excavatinF with due care
to secutre the precious minerals and met.'Is in the soil,
because he might th4-reby cause some slight injury to his nei
ghbor's water supply.
o say that a doctrine so manifestty
fair and just as that stated by t he New Nampshire courts,
having at its basis good sense and reason and looking to
the proper protection of the rights of property in view of
all the circumstanc,-s and necessities of each particular case
would hinder one from properly pursuing the tillage of the
soil or draining it

in a siitable manner;

or restrain him

from levelling forests and converting them into arable lands
because of the resuiting :reatly increased evaporation of the
moisture in the soil, are statements that it

sounds incred-

ib e to impute to the learned ,judges Who spoke them. The
arg ment against th feasibility of adopting a rule so
difficult of application because of the Fihadowy uncertainties of' its subject matter, alone remains.

Somet.hing must

be offered tu explain the "myst'eriouls inf'luences and agencies,

secret, chan~eabile, and uncontroi7i able "that1'govern and
re .ulate the efistenc,

and

roes" of water percolating

in the sol!, a substance so easy to u.,nderstand and ready to

obey ajpoarently, iuitil it

gets oft, of our sight beneath the

We hae left then only to invoke the

surface of the 9srth.

aid of science t o inject into an enlighiened

,ench a few i

first elements of Thys ic,;awt st rcf.ura1 ge ology, and the
theory of the accepted doctrine is apparently exp '.oded.
That "he strict and arbitrary rule as laid riown by
these early decisions has b,-Ien found unsatisfactory,

in many

cases tot ally incorsistent with well grounded principles
of right and worse than lseless as a

ii-de to the courts in

soliting the difficult Situlations presented,is shown bythe
subtle ind purely fictional distincti.ons that have been resotted to, ulnder pressure of necessity, to qualify it, and
that by its most persistent sipporters.
For exam,.le, take the New York case of Pixley v
lark (35 N.Y.

520 ).The injury corn lainwd of was the sat-

ura. ion of a piece of land by percolations
the natu.ral banks of the river,
cauised_ b

forced through

from the increased pressure

4endnt's dam raising the level of the stream.

The court uphed14 the action on a very nice riistiinction first
suggested in th~e i :ngiish cqose of Grand Junction Banal Co. v

Shugar (B.R.6 Ch. 487), between interrui~ting percolating
water on its way to
by percolat, ion af, ,r
arose

.

spring

or stream, and abstracting i~t

having reached There.

The question

ore directly in Village of D)elhi v Yolmans (45 N.Y.

362 )', where the proposition was stated by Judr.ge Peckham,
thus: "If

te action of the defendant took the water away

from the springs after it

had reached there, after it

had

become part of an open ruinning stream, then the action would
lie".

It

The same distinction is

is interestinF to note tht

sity

followed in many other states,

the courts, from the neces-

of preserving their better rule as t.,o surface streams,

having made thid arbitrary rule in view of" the insurmountable difficulties of' proof of prcolat ing waters, now make a
an except.ion to it,

based u14;on

a distinction that requires

proof not oniy of the generdl course of the percolations,
btt of their direction as well.

Take the case of a perenniJ

al spring serving as an out-let to the

,urface

or the

waters percolating t.hrough the gravelly stratum of a large
sect.ion of" the surroiinding country.
owner sinks

An adjoining land

lar~e well through the same stratum nd as a

naturai consequence the ,,olume of the spring is rereatly reduced.

But who shall wheTher that, diminution of quantity

was 'ca.sed by an interrup-tion of the percolat ions t1hat were
the sources o " the spring; or an a:bstraction of the water of
the spring itself ne~riy as fa.st as "fhev reach-d it;

or

can we properly say that eit.h~r one or the other is the
fact separately and~not the t,'.o toget.her?

)r, having proven

caerfuIly the general course and direction of the percolations, and haiing determined whether such enormois and unIreasonabie well may or may not
iTs proJector -has taken car,

;:e ma intained, according as

to locate it

relatively to the

direction of the cirrent, on one side of the spring or the
other, where now is tfhe excuse for not adj-.udicting

the

case in a)ccordance .witfh the doctrine of reasonable use and
in view of the correspondent rights of the respective property owners,

since the percolations ha-ve become as welI,

kno-?,n and d-fined by reasonable inference as the law requires of t.he subterranean currents to which that doctrine
does apply.
Three comrarativeiv recent

case.s in Massachuset.ts

in the same-direction ar. entertaining as illustrations of the elastic pos-sibitities in-volved in distinguishing carefully the case in point from such precedents as seem, to_,"the
layma,n, at, le4.4

somewhat similar.

In the first, Bailey

'v-Wor.urn

(126 Mass. 416),

the towm had taken lands on the ,order of a pond and constructed on it a water gallery .frorm which to supply the inhabitanta .with water.

Direct: ..
: connection between ga.llery

and p~ond was manie ey pipes, but it was found unnecessary to
use= them by reason of the filtration.

It

was held that the

ripl}hto

use the nipes e-xi stad nevertheless,

was taking the water within th

an4 that, t his

meaning of the statute au-

thorizing the act.
In Ae.tna ,ils

v

iaL t,'ham (126 iss.

422

the

facts were precisely the same ':xc--ptt hat, there was no

direct, connection withi the stream.
on te

An artificiaI embankment

border formed o(ne side of the water gallery and part

of the water sltpp~y filererd tlrough it

f'rom the river.

This was also Keld t aking the water fr,)m the river under
the statute.
In the third cse, Aetna VjTili
MO.ss.

69 ),

IT

Brookline (127

the town constructe4 itts wter gliery on land

conveyed to it, by quitctlaim. deed near the river from which
it was authoriz'A to take water under statite.

Bt

inding

that the water percolating1into the gallery was sufficient,
they mqde no connect ion with the river, directly or indirectly, and defended, squiarely on the right to the percolations
in or coming to their own
cpMe from the river.

and, admitting that some of it

The opinion discusses the general rle

a.s sta~ted un Wiison v New Bedford ( Supra

and mentionc, the

exception, or rather distinction, made by Grand Junction
(',anal Co. v Shugar (SuTra),
f'ined stream by percolation,

of' taking the water of a. debut appa:rently rei~uct~antto, come

out sqyIarely in

favor of such exception iintil compelled to,

they avoi.d. the question by resorting to P.n exaggeration of
their grofn of' ecision in the preceding cses, and hold
simiy that taking by percolation is suifficient within the
meaning of the statuite.
An earlier assachusetts case is cited by the
text writers as a leading authority

Tor

the rather startling

proposition, in view of the established law -as to percolating wat''rs in that state, that irrespective of the
question whether the

.iv ersion is by intercepting the per-

colations that form the spr ing or not,

a rialroad company

is liable in damages if an excavation made for its road
drains a well on land ad.jacent bit not crossed by its line.
The learned .judge,

after stating in his opinion that the

rile as to adjacent prolertv owners is exactly oppositedeci
des the case,justly but not logically, upon a distinction
between ownership and the special usufructuary right of the
r-alroad.

The owner of the property ,hrou-<h which the road

rassed might. cleariy have made the excaration, or any one
else to whom he chose to give t.he rihtt

to make it,

without

liability bei~ng incurred to t~e adjacent owner by either.
But the law that governs a. monied railroad cor oration is
apparently a different thing altoget her.

It wi*i

;e

oted that t-he cases present the

question of th, ownership of percolating waters in two disfinct aspects:

the one involiinr the qutestion of' the re-

se, ctive rights to the use of the water itself', whi'le the
other deals with the right to use lbhe property, the qu. .stion
o" ri-ht to the w ater in it arisilg only incidentally as
the iartictardrection in which th- act of the defendant
upon his own land, lawful but, unreasonable,
to the plaintiif.

Th e real reason for

causes injury

reqching a solution

of the problemso little in accord with fundamental .jtstice,
as the generally accepted rule is,

seems to me to lie

wholly in this latter class of ca.ses, all th-at the courts
have said about the practical uncertainties of its subject
matter notwithstanding.

There exists no real reason in

theory or practice why the respecti-TP rights of adjacent
l nd ownwrs iri tiie waters perclating through the soil,
should not be adjudicated according to, a rulie as well adapted to secure the best and fullest enjoyment of' landed
prop rty as that which governs surface streams.
itself is

no less vailuable,

The water

ad h~s to he resorted to as

tlwe source of sutpply far oftener, both by reasonof the
scarcity of natural streams and the, poor quliity of the
water f'outnd in them.

Large sections of countr.j are supplied

wholly by wells ta.kin!, their souirce in the filtrations of
the soil, without. which the land itself' would ire uninhabitabie and vorthiess.

But to say thiat the use;e- of' percolating

water is a right which each property ownwr must, exercise
resona-dy and in view of the wants and nec.essities of his
neighbor, iT

.or the court-s to recopnize in it. such a right

of i.roperty as the, cannot consistently tot,lly dirregard
in the second class of' cases, where tie diversioy df 1Ie
filtra- ons is caused ov a lawful, t

,hoivh
unreasonable,

use

of' ore's property, hut without any intention or desire,
eithpr to 4eprive his neighbor of the water, or secur-, it
for himse~f.
At all iimes the courts h,,e been reluctant, to
abridrge by .a.ny ].itation whatsoeer the absolutelUfreedoni
of the individual to use 9nd enjoy his own property as he
sees Hit,

So st-eadfastly have

so !.onP as he acts law'tiLy.

some re, isted any encroachment upon this

ield, as to deny

reconpition even to the ewxception maide hy the fivil Law,
of acts instipated

yv malice,, ma.intaining that, the exercise

of a legal right cannot, in any case,
motiv,-o which controls it,.

But

be aiffected by the

.rant.ing that the court's

should be conservative in yielding, the posi tion is neverthe less one that cannot r-e st rictly maintained.

That, they

haVe frequently been compeiled to Iiepart rom it .actually,

thoph perhaps not opniy, is seen in the a-1lication of the
highw-ys,
%iple.
ld
nuismncs in regard to air, and -y noises, nd

*maxim,

"Sic ftere"Ppc,

to c>rses of wat,,.r cours~es,

numero,s other familiar instances.

A rulei, that

ives to one

thie right t.o use his property as he ch,,oses absolnt,.-VLy, does
not, insure him the fullest ]po,"sible enjoyment of it, since
it

is to such a, depree dependent on the conduct of surround-

prop ,-rty owners, and the same privilege must be extended to

In the particular ,iirection we are considering,
the rep-ined rtidstinctionl; made whenever possible to alleviate
thh

harshness of: the strict rule,

and. the illogical and in-

consistent d.cisions that have resulted,

indicate clearly t'.

the tendency of the law under the pressure of necessity.
Two comparativliy recent decisions are i.nteresting to note
in this connection.
l-n

innard v Standard Oil Co.

Kentucky c.se decidle,i in

(7 L.1R.A. 45i5

'a

t890.
the leakage of oil, stored in

iqrge quantities on dei'end'nt's land,

damaged plaintiff's

spring by corrupting the perculat ions that supplied it.

ft

was squarely held that, although one may ap] ropriate all
the und. rground water in his soii, he. still

righ,

to c,,ntaminate it,

bors'

lpnd it

has not the

so that, when it. reaches his neigh-

will be, unfit, for use by either man or beast.

The wisdom, the absolute necessity, of reaching that conciusion in such cqses is

obviou,' bu" no le.;s so is

logicnlinconsistency of' ihp two propolsitiois.

the

fn comm -nt-

ing upon the 1.ery res.ectable line o. authorities that have
taken-a.

similar stand, Judge. Cooley, in 'ipjohn v lichland

Township ( 46 Mich. 542

X

very -ptly says: *Bu,

if with-

drawing the water from one's well by an excavation on adjoining lands will give no right of' action, it, is difficult
to understand how corrupting its waters by a proper use of
+he adjoining premises can be actionab.?e, when there is no
actuai intent to injure and no negligence.

The one act de-

strolys the well, and the other does no more;

the injury, is

the same in kind and degree in the twos cases.
Perhaps a, still better illustration of the insurmountable i"ficuities that must, sooner or later, confront all courts in their a.ttempted adherence to so unress(nable a rile, is the case of Golins v ,hprtiers Valley
Gas Co.( 131 Pa.Sti,.

143Y.

The defendant Gas Company drilled

well upon their land, in consequence of which salt water
found in a lower stratum'., arose and. mixed with the fresh
water of an upper st.ratum,, and ruined
surro' iding: secti.on of country.

1i t~he wells of the

The well was drill ed in

the ordinary manner,

a.nd in all respects suitable for the

pur ose for which it

was intended, but the contamination of

the f'resh water by the s,it could ha're been forseen by reasonable i n f-renc,
pense.

and prevented(at

a slight, additional ex-

The equities of' the case so clearly necessitated a

modification of the established rtle in the interest of the
pub].ic good, that the courts were constrained to. sustain
the contention of the plaintiffs, and chose the ground of
negligence as the basis for their departure.

The decision

i-s well considered and will serve, presumably, as 9,precedent tor the redress of numerots injuries that before were
unjustly s, yied,"dpmnum absque injuria,".
Negiigenc: implies the lack of reasonable care,
or care proportional to the risk under all the circumstances
of egach particularcase;

and the circumstances that serve in

these cases as the standard of' ci.re to be exercised, are
simply the wants
owners.

nd necessities of the surrounding land

In regard then to our more difficult, class of

cases, we find the cout'ts of Pennsylvania and New Hampshire
in

exact harmony by ,rirtue of rules differently stated, but

pr.cisely the same in effect:

that where one excavates upon

or otherwise uses his iand, but not for the purpose of collecting th!e filtrations for himself, he must act, in regard
to -them, not only lawf'ully but without negligence ;

o~r, in

ot-her vords, in a manner that under all the ci.rcumstances
of the pa..rticular cp-se is

reasonable,

:nd necessities of his neighbors.

But

in view of the wants
,

bound by precedents

that they hesit:),te w,olly to overthrow, the Pennsyivania
coiirts still adhere to the strict rule in the other simpler

Pnd no -ess equite.ble cla.ss of cases, whereothe excavation
is for the express purpose of collecting the filtrations:
to which it had probably never been applied but for the the
d ifficulties involved in the analagous line of cases in respect to which they have now departed from it.

As the law

of Pennsyi-anie now stands, apparently one who sinks a
shaft to reach valuab e minerals in the soil, and thereby
injures the neighboring weils, when he might reasonably
have avoided so doing, is liable; while if the same injuiry
is caused by the sinking o8' an immense well for the express
purpose

of co.llecting the f'iltrations, no matter how useless

or unreasonable it may be, it is wholly without redress.
In the opinion of the ca.se just, discussed, Mr.
Justice Mitchell, in commenting upon the fact that, negiip ence, or care proportional to the risk, presupposes knowledge, more or less perfect,

of the conditions involved,

finds such kno ,ledge in the practical in 'ormat ion gained by
sinking wells almost witho'it number throughout, the stae,

d-uring recent years, and says with a frankness tha t is at,
Least rffrgshing:
present day,

.-..

"If'

this is the state of knowledge at the
then, clearly, it

wou'd be a. violation

of the living spirit o-f the law not to recognize the change,
and. :-,Tpiy the .settled and immutab'e princil-.ies, of right to,
the altered con4itions of fact.

Granting that the earlier

judges were actua.ted by the most praistv.,orthy motives of

expedi-ncy, n.nd built t.s best they could amid. the difficulties by which they were confronted,

are we justified in

suffering in our midst a crumbling cr:.7ation of ancient law,
from beneath which advanced science has removed the last bit
of foundation,

to fail, piece by piece, upon the innofen-

sire victims of its injustice, until it
own .Hestruction?

has wrought its

